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THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY. By Walter V. Schaefer. Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston, Illinois 1967. Reviewed by Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., of the Virginia Bar (Richmond). 
This timely and superbly written volume, by one of America's 
most respected state judges, contains the Rosenthal Lectures 
delivered in the spring of 1966 at Northwestern University School 
of Law. The subject is custodial police interrogation and the 
constitutional doctrines bearing upon it, with emphasis on the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
Justice Schaefer anticipated that the convergence of these 
doctrines would preclude the effective questioning of persons 
suspected of crime. It is a tribute to Justice Schaefer's prescience 
that he held this view in the spring of 1966 after Escobedo* but 
before Miranda.** The earlier decision had extended the Sixth 
Amendment right t to counsel to the "accusatory" stage when attention 
had focused upon a "prime suspect." Miranda, decided in June, 1966, 
and reading new doctrine into the Fifth Amendment, encompassed all 
"custodial interrogation" regardless of the "stage" or whether 
suspicion had "focused." 
In the subsequent months debate has raged - in the Congress, at 
bar meetings and in the literature - as to the effect which these 
historic cases will have on police interrogation. That it will be 
severely curtailed, few can doubt. The debate centers on questions 
of degree, on certain remaining ambiguities,*** and also - among 
/ *Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
V **Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
***See Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645 (1967); Warden, Miranda - Some 
History, Some Observations and Some Questions, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 39 
(1966); George, A New Look at Confessions: Escobedo-The Second 
Round, a collection of lectures and panel discussions sponsored 
by the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Ann Arbor, 1967. 
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academicians primarily - as to whether interrogation is worth saving. 
Justice -Schaefer sheds light on all of this. 
One would have thought that the usefulness, if not indeed the 
necessity, , of police interrogation was beyond rational debate. As 
Justice Schaefer notef, a high percentage of all criminal cases is 
disposed of upon pleas of guilty, and in most of these cases the 
accused has confessed or admitted guilt upon interrogation.* Many 
cases which go to trial also involve pre-arraignment admissions. 
Thus, the issue relates to a cornerstone of our present system~ 
In assessing the usefulness of interrogation and the role of 
resulting confessions, Justice Schaefer is keenly aware of abuses 
in the past, and of the impossibility of eliminating all oppressive 
conduct short of outlawing all interrogation.** But balancing the 
interests involved, he concludes that "police interrogation (is) a 
useful and desirable technique of law enforcement." Justice Schaefer 
is in good company. If we look only to former members of the Court, 
Justices Frankfurter, Goldberg and Jackson each tha~ recognized 
the utility of police interrogation.** 
Supporters of the new restrictions, while applauding the 
broadened protection of suspects, argue that law enforcement will 
not be unduly handicapped. First, they suggest tmt resourceful, 
*Studies show the percentage of convictions resulting from guilty 
pleas running as high as 98% in some jurisdictions. See Goldstein, 
The State and the Accused, 69 Yale L.J., 1149, 1163 n.37 (1960). 
**He notes that the legal systems of other countries, even where 
interrogation is restricted, do not go to the extreme of excluding 
all evidence obtained without regard to its reliability. 
✓ **1\Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "Questioning suspects is indispensable 
in law enforcement." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578 
(1961) (separate opinion), quoting People v. Hall, 413 Ill. , 615, 
624, 110 N.E.2d 249, 254 (1953). See also Mr. Justice Jackson's 
statement in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 58 (1949)(concerning 
in part, dissenting in part); and that of Mr. Justice Goldberg in 




well trained and scientifically equipped police can obtain necessary 
evidence without resort to interrogation. Yet, as Justice Schaefer 
states from his own experience, even where witnesses are available 
to identify the suspect, such evidence often is unreliable. And 
past experience indicates that relatively few convictions result 
from laboratory or scientific investigation. If, as now proposed 
to the Congress, electronic surviellance is who~ly denied to law 
enforcement, a most effective means of scientific detection will 
not be available - even against organized crime. 
It is also argued by some that meaningful interrogation will 
not in fact be eliminated. The opinion in Miranda merely lays down 
a detailed code of procedure. If this procedure is strictly followed, 
interrogation may take place - provided the suspect does not request 
counsel. This is a significant proviso. The suspect is entitled to 
counsel unless he knowingly "waives" the right. No lawyer ''worth his 
salt" will permit his client to be interrogated by police.* As this 
right to counsel, provided at State expense, becomes generally known 
and as court decisions implement Miranda and Escobedo, the only room 
for doubt concerns the extent to which interrogation and investigation 
will be handicapped.** 
For his part, Justice Schaefer concludes: 
Today, I believe, the doctrines converging 
upon the institution of police interrogation 
are threatening to push on to their logical 
conclusion - to the point where no questioning 
of suspects will be permitted. 
-lcMr. Justice Jackson, in Watts v. Indiana, supr~ at •S9. 
V **Another distinguished state court justice, also writing prior to 
Miranda, described the situation as a "mounting crisis" in the con-
stitutional rules that "reach out to govern police interrogation." 
Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, 
and Trial, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 664 (1966). See also Friendly, 
The Bill of Ri hts as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 
929 1965; Lumbar, The Administration of Criminal Justice: Some 
Problems and Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J. 840 (1963). 
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One solution, he suggests, lies in the development of a legislative 
code to govern the defendant's pre-arraignment rights. In this 
context, Justice Schaefer analyzes sympathetically the proposed 
ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proced~re.·* This contemplates 
three periods of detention: on the scene for 20 minutes without 
counsel; for four hours at the police station, with counsel if 
desired; and thereafter in certain cases for a longer period but 
only upon consent of counsel. Although commending the Code as a 
"rational adjustment," Justice Schaefer questions whether the 
Sixth Amendment requires a lawyer's presence during any period of 
police interrogation. If the Constitution requires a lawyer for 
station house interrogation, logic would require him for on-the• 
scene interrogation as well. It would be "obviously impracticable," 
he adds, "to equip every squad car with instant counsel." 
Yet, Miranda appears to require just that. Its principal 
thrust is against "custodial interrogation." This was defined 
as including "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been ••• deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way."'k,\- As Professor Kamisar has said, the 
language used by the Court "clearly covers the stop-on-the•street-
and-question situation."** Thus, unless the Court's language 
is modified, there cannot be "on the scene" interrogation without 
counsel if he is requested. 
*Prepared by American Law Institute, Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966. 
V **Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444. 
✓ **""George, supra pp. 98, 99. ~, ,\ r4 
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In the last of his three brillant lectures, Justice Schaefer 
subjects the privilege against self-incrimination to searching 
scrutiny. He concludes that the privilege, as now interpreted, 
is justified neither by its history nor by any need to protect 
the innocent in a criminal trial.* The historic purpose of the 
privilege, as he noted, is protection against governmental sup-
pression of ideas - particularly against inquisitions into 
political or religious beliefs. This high purpose "now is in 
the process of being remitted to ' the First Amendment" where it 
belongs. There is an emerging "First Amendment privilege" not 
to respond to questions which diminish the significance of the 
Fifth Amendment.** 
If ascertainment of the truth is - as one would hope - a 
basic objective of our criminal justice system, we should put 
aside slavish adherence to the privileg~ and adopt more realistic 
reforms. Justice Schaefer thinks the answer lies in broad mutual 
discovery in criminal cases. He recalls the fight, three decades 
ago, for pre-trial discovery in civil cases, now proved success-
ful beyond even the fondest hopes. 
*As to the history, see 3 Wigmore, Evidence 819 (3d ed. 1940); 
Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930); Developments in the Law -
Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935 (1966); Morgan, The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1949). As to 
protection of the innocent, in Tehan v. United States ex rel. 
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966), the Court itself said that 
"the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-
incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from 
conviction. • • • " 
**As harbingers of the trend, Justice Schaefer cites Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); 




There is, indeed, a clearly discernable movement toward 
increased discovery in criminal cases.* But discovery will remain 
largely a "one way street" so long as the accused may invoke the 
privilege. 
Nor would mutual discovery procedures, familiar in civil 
cases, be entirely appropriate in criminal cases. The real need is 
for discovery or interrogation before a judicial officer, where the 
suspect's rights can be safeguarded but where the goal would be 
ascertainment of the facts - as known both to the prosecution 
and the defense - at an early stage in the proceedings. The magistrate, 
before whom the suspect would be brought promptly, would advise of 
the right to remain silent. But the suspect should also "be advised 
that if he is subsequently charged, his failure to answer will be 
disclosed at his trial." This would be the only sanction.*1t 
Justice Schaefer recognizes, of course, that judicially super-
vised interrogation would be impossible under prevailing Court 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. The seriousness and difficulty 
of amending the Bill of Rights is self-evident; yet, it is probable 
that most lawyers, and other citizens as well, will agree that "the 
time has come for intensive public consideration" of a solution of 
the interrogation dilemma. 
*See Report, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice 138, 139 (1967). 
**Interestingly, Justice Schaefer's proposal has precendent . under the 
early common law in England, accused felons were examined by 
magistrates and their answers were introduced in evidence at trial. 
See 8 Wigmore, Evidence 286 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Morgan, supra, 
at 18. The English practice was followed in the American colonies. 





T This forthright call for consideration of a constitutional 
amendment, by one of Justice Schaefer's stature, judicial experience 
and dedication to justice, deserves the most thoughtful response.* 
*See Report, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, Additional Views of Seven Members, 
303-308 (1967), endorsing in substance Justice Schaefer's proposal. 
